"The idea of the paper was to focus on the particular gender identity norm, which is the idea that men should earn more than their wives. It’s an interesting one to focus on because it’s a norm that may only have become binding today. It may not have been that relevant in the past because women were much less likely to have the potential to out-earn their husbands, and now they do. So the idea of the paper was to investigate the empirical relevance of this norm among households as well as its implications. ...
"We were talking about income inequality, and one of our colleagues said, basically, “Well, at the end of the day, who cares? Yes, maybe we’re growing apart economically, but on Sunday all we all do is watch TV. We are growing apart economically, but our lives may not be that different; they may, in fact, have converged.”
"Then we built a metric of cultural distance between groups by income. There are many ways you could measure distance. We use a machine-learning algorithm and aggregate a number of methods that allow us to find the best model to predict someone’s income based on the brands or products they report consuming or the attitudes the person has. ...
"The main headline result of the paper is that most of the trend lines are flat. Our ability to predict someone’s income based on the consumption of particular goods and brands is essentially the same today as it was 25 years ago. There’s no trend in our ability to predict people’s income based on how they spend their time today, compared to close to 50 years ago. The only area where we see some slight evidence of divergence on income is with respect to social attitudes, where our ability to predict people’s income based on what they think, their views, is slightly better today than it was in the early 1970s. ...
"[N]ow we’ve done this exercise, as I said, for race, gender and urbanicity. When we first got these results on income, people said, especially in the context of the recent election, “Well, income is not the important one; it’s urban/rural. That’s the important divide in America.” We’ve also done it based on political attitudes, and the main result, which I just gave you for income—there’s no big trend—essentially applies to, at a first-level of approximation, everything that we have looked at.
"The one really large exception quantitatively is our ability to predict whether someone is liberal or conservative/Democrat or Republican based on their social attitudes. That has been increasing over time. So liberals and conservatives haven’t been diverging over time on TV consumption, brands or goods, but on social views they have been diverging a lot over time.
"The results were surprising to us. We went into this with in the back of our mind the discussion that’s happening right now [that Americans are increasingly divided along economic and other lines], and we really thought that we were going to see signs of that in the data.
"How do I rationalize the results? It’s not clear, but here’s one thought when it comes to products and brands. I think today we think you can easily see who is rich or poor because rich people own an iPhone and poor people don’t; but, then, 25 years ago, it was whether you owned a DVD player that separated rich and poor. There are waves of technological changes—the rich, the more educated are always going to be the early adopters of those—but there are constant waves of technological change."在破碎的家庭中，认知技能的性别差异更大
"[T]he gender gap in noncognitive skills is particularly large in broken families. And that term can mean many different things. It’s low income, it’s absent fathers, it’s less education, it’s fewer parental inputs. ... If you have boys doing more poorly in broken families, that means that a lot of these boys become less marriageable. That means more single moms and more broken families in the future and hence, again, more boys growing up in conditions where they may not get the kind of parenting that could address whatever deficiencies they have in noncognitive skills. ... One argument we make in the paper is that boys may be born at greater risk of having noncognitive problems than girls. ... And if that’s true, then it’s particularly important to have stronger parenting for boys than girls in order to correct this deficit. But, again, that’s highly speculative."